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Anthony Vitarellit
This Note examines the neoclassical economic framework that pervades
contemporary benefit-cost analysis and considers how the fields of
behavioral economics and hedonic adaptation may offer superior tools for
assessing how regulations impact human behavior. These new hedonic
metrics attempt to quantify happiness-rather than monetize utility-and
measure how outcomes influence well-being and affect Through the
evaluation of three case studies, this Note considers the flaws of the current
approach and how hedonic metrics can supplement prevailing techniques to
address these shortcomings. Finally, this Note assesses the legal regimes that
govern how courts review agency decisionmaking and suggests that the
failure to incorporate hedonic metrics may render agency actions vulnerable
to challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act.
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Introduction
Federal agencies possess vast delegated power from Congress to craft
rules to govern human behavior and firm activity. Since the 1980s, the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has coordinated agencies' rulemaking
activities to ensure consistency across the executive branch. Empowered
by a series of executive orders that centralized regulatory control within
the White House, OIRA reviews the benefit-cost analyses (BCAs)-known
as regulatory impact assessments (RIAs)-that agencies conduct for their
proposed rules. If the analysis does not meet OIRA standards, the agency
cannot continue through the rulemaking process. This concentration of
power places a premium on creating BCAs in accordance with OIRA's best
practices. With each passing administration, more power has accrued to
OMB away from the agencies, and the trend does not appear to be
reversing. Indeed, upon taking office, President Barack Obama issued a
statement declaring that "centralized review is both legitimate and
appropriate as a means of promoting regulatory goals."1
This Note considers whether the existing OMB best practices for BCAs
actually capture the full impact of regulation on human behavior.
Contemporary regulatory analysis relies on traditional assumptions of
neoclassical economics, which recent research has shown to be at best an
incomplete account of how individuals act and at worst a clear
misrepresentation. This Note, therefore, draws from the burgeoning
literature in the fields of behavioral economics and hedonic adaptation to
suggest that new metrics-measures of subjective well-being and
moment-to-moment affect-might provide a more holistic account of how
individuals realize costs and benefits.
1 Regulatory Review: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009).
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I examines how the United
States developed a system in which a small staff of analysts in OIRA
determines whether agencies may continue to regulate in accordance with
their assessments of social need. It considers the theoretical justifications
for BCA and reviews the accepted best practices. Part II diverges from the
traditional neoclassical framework and considers how the understandings
of behavioral economics and the development of hedonic metrics can
inform BCA. Part III presents three original case studies of significant
federal regulations, which were justified by neoclassical RIAs, and
considers how the new metrics may provide a more complete
understanding of the regulations' effects. Part IV considers how the
development of hedonic metrics may influence the review of agency
rulemakings under the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and
capricious standard. The Note concludes with recommendations for
agencies and courts relating to the incorporation of hedonic metrics into
regulatory analyses.
I. Economic Impact Analyses of Proposed Federal Regulations
Before any agency enacts a regulation, it must propose its rule to the
public for comments and to OMB for intra-government approval. OMB
requires each agency to construct benefit-cost analyses to justify their
proposed regulations, and OIRA evaluates these analyses. Section L.A
considers the evolution of centralized White House control over agency
rulemaking through a series of executive orders beginning in the Reagan
Administration and culminating in the promulgation of OMB Circular A-4.
Section I.B reviews the theoretical justification for benefit-cost analysis.
Section L.C examines the details of current best practices.
A. The Development of Executive Order 12,866 and Circular A-4
Centralized review of executive branch rulemaking by OMB is "not a
recent innovation." 2 The earliest version of the contemporary rule-making
review regime appeared in President Richard Nixon's 1971 "Quality of Life
Review," in which he required agencies to transmit proposed "significant"
regulations to other agencies for comment. 3 President Gerald Ford built
upon this regulation in 1974 by ordering OMB to analyze the inflationary
impact of all federal rules. 4 As the scope of executive branch rulemaking
2 JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 21 (4th ed. 2006). See
generally Symposium, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 533
(1989).
3 Memorandum from George P. Schultz, Dir., Office of Mgmt & Budget, to Heads of
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 5, 1971), available at
http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLifel.htm.
4 See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974).
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increased, President Jimmy Carter sought to increase centralized
oversight.5 His 1978 Executive Order (E.O.) 12,0446 required that agencies
draft a "regulatory analysis" for any rule with a probable economic impact
exceeding $100 million. 7 Carter also created the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group, 8 which evaluated proposed rules, and the Regulatory
Council, which sought to harmonize executive branch action "to screen
proposed rules and guard against duplication."9 Though these early efforts
began to rein in uncoordinated government action, truly centralized
control of executive branch rulemaking did not begin in earnest until the
election of President Ronald Reagan. 10
In the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act, Congress created OIRA within
OMB, directly preceding Reagan's election." Though it would ultimately
become the primary organ of centralized review, Congress granted OIRA a
limited mandate: to "oversee the review and approval of [agency]
information collection requests."'12 The Act mandated that OIRA examine
all agency proposals to ensure that they were "necessary"13 and did not
create superfluous paperwork for the regulated entity.' 4 Nothing in the
Act's legislative history indicates that Congress intended OIRA to assume
the sweeping authorities it would acquire throughout the subsequent two
decades. Despite the ostensible lack of congressional intent, OIRA's
authority began to accrue almost immediately.
Quickly upon his arrival in office, President Reagan sought to expand
OIRA's role and powers. In early 1981, he issued E.O. 12,291, which
empowered OIRA to review all "major" agency proposals and analyses.' 5
Reagan's primary intent behind E.O. 12,291 was "to minimize duplication
and conflict [among] regulations and to ensure well-reasoned
regulations." 16 The E.O. also imposed numerous requirements upon
agencies engaged in the rulemaking process and mandated that the
5 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscuzi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation,
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1003,1035-36 (2006).
6 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978).
7 See id. § 3; Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The
Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 987 (2001).
8 See 43 Fed. Reg. at 12,668.
9 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change,
and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1197 n.453 (1988).
10 See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Note, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 601, 613 (2008).
11 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as re-enacted at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20
(2000)).
12 44 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (2000).
13 ld. § 3504(c)(2).
14 Id.§3501.
15 Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-29 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,866, § 11, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-04 (2000).
16 Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213,
253.
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agencies conduct benefit-cost analyses of their proposals.' 7 Specifically,
"to the extent permitted by law," E.O. 12,291 empowered OIRA to review
every executive branch rule and determine whether it provided "any
beneficial effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms."18 As Elena
Kagan has noted, "the order effectively gave OMB a form of substantive
control over rulemaking: under the order, OMB had authority to determine
the adequacy of an impact analysis and to prevent publication of a
proposed or final rule, even indefinitely, until the completion of the review
process."19 E.O. 12,291 signified a dramatic break with past practice,
shifting power away from cabinet departments and independent agencies
toward 0MB.20 Agencies exercised dramatically curtailed authority to
promulgate their desired regulations, and O1RA served as the
clearinghouse for all executive branch regulatory activity.
After his reelection, President Reagan acted to increase OMB's role
not only in reviewing executive branch rulemakings but also in proactively
coordinating the Administration's regulatory agenda. Reagan's E.O. 12,498
required agency leaders to submit an annual plan of proposed rulemakings
to ensure "consistency with the goals of the Administration." 21 As a natural
consequence of E.O. 12,498, OMB became involved in agency rulemaking
at the pre-proposal stage, rather than only after rules had been proposed
and benefit-cost analyses conducted.2 2 By the conclusion of his second
term, Reagan had issued three additional executive orders concerning how
regulations impacted federalism interests, family rights, and individual
property rights; agency RIAs were to include assessments of how their
proposed rules would affect each of these rights. President George H.W.
Bush did not deviate substantially from the Reagan blueprint. Due to
heated congressional criticism of OIRA, however, President Bush
deputized Vice President Dan Quayle to lead a "Council on
17 For a thorough discussion of these requirements, see Steven Croley, White House
Review of Federal Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824-26
(2003).
18 Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3; see also David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger:
Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1108-
09 (2008) (discussing E.O. 12,291's substantive requirements and their implications).
19 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2278 (2001).
20 The Office of Legal Counsel sanctioned this transfer of authority as being justified
under the "take care" clause of the Constitution. See Wendy L. Gramm, Additional Procedures
Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12291 and 12498 [Revised], Memorandum
to Heads of Departments and Agencies (une 13, 1986), reprinted in OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE
REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT app. 11 (1988).
21 Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
22 Cf. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1995) (observing that Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 "placed OIRA in the center of
regulatory planning").
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Competitiveness," which exercised concurrent authority with OIRA on
several rulemakings. 2
3
Unlike President Bush, who largely stayed the course, President Bill
Clinton sought quickly to streamline and to clarify the executive branch's
regime of regulatory coordination, evaluation, and approval.24 Within ten
months of his inauguration, he issued E.O. 12,866 on September 30,
1993.25 While maintaining the "general framework of presidential review
of rulemaking," the new E.O. formally revoked Executive Orders 12,291
and 12,498 and would ultimately become the primary vehicle of
regulatory approval through the current day.2 6 Like the former planning
requirements of E.O. 12,497, E.O. 12,866 still required agencies to submit
regulatory plans to OMB, 27 but "for the first time independent regulatory
agencies [were] specifically directed to comply with the planning"
process.28 In addition, E.O. 12,866 limited OIRA review of agency analyses
only to "significant regulatory actions." 29 Scholars have estimated that this
shift reduced by approximately 75% the total number of regulations
reviewed by OIRA each year. 30 Most significantly for purposes of this Note,
the order acknowledged the potential shortfalls of traditional, quantified
benefit-cost analysis and required the submission of "qualitative measures
of costs and benefits." 31
By the end of his second term, Clinton-much like Reagan-
promulgated a number of regulatory executive orders on a host of issues
23 See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 168 (1995) ("OIRA lacked an
advice-and-consent appointee to wield its authority over executive agencies ... [and] the Council
on Competitiveness stepped in to fill the political void.").
24 See Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the
Administrative State," 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1506 n.24 (2007); Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham,
Due Process and Management for Guidance Documents: Good Governance Long Overdue, 25 YALE J.
ON REG. 103, 104 n.8 (2008) ("[U]nder E.O. 12,291, OIRA reviewed 2637 rules in 1982 (79 were
economically significant) and in 1990 reviewed 2137 (82 were economically significant). By
contrast, under E.O. 12,866, OIRA reviewed 831 rules in 1994 (134 were economically significant)
and in 2002 reviewed 669 rules (100 were economically significant).").
25 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
26 Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.I. 1257,1270 (2006).
27 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(c).
28 LUBBERS, supra note 2, at 30.
29 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(1). The order defines a "significant regulatory action"
as "any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more... (2) Create a serious [regulatory] inconsistency... (3)
Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements.... or (4) Raise novel legal or policy
issues.... Id. § (3)(f0.
30 See, e.g., CURTIS W. COPELAND, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHANGES TO THE OMB
REGULATORY REVIEW PROCESS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13422, at 2 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33862.pdf.
31 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a); see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 125-27 (5th ed. 2002) (describing the order and
its qualitative requirements).
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spanning civil justice reform, environmental justice, and consultation with
Indian tribes.32 Likewise, President George W. Bush maintained 12,866's
framework for most of his Administration, though after six years he
changed course slightly by issuing E.O. 13,422. 33 The order requires
agencies to be even more explicit about the specific market failure they
intend to remedy through regulation, 34 and "[s]everal amendments
formally recognize the existence and legitimacy of 'guidance
documents."'
35
In 1994, after President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, his
OMB convened a group of regulatory experts to develop "best practices" to
govern agency regulatory impact analyses. 36 After an "exhaustive two-year
effort," the group issued a report entitled Economic Analysis of Federal
Regulations Under Executive Order 12866, which provided a technical guide
for regulators seeking to present benefit-cost analyses to OMB. 37 Five
years later, despite the change in administration, President Bush's OMB
reaffirmed this guidance in 2001.38 Finally, in 2003, the Bush
Administration promulgated 0MB Circular A-4-a significant departure
from the previous, vague guidelines-which continues to establish the
"best practices" followed by agencies today.39 Circular A-4 was "developed
through a multi-year process that included a collaboration of analysts at
OMB and the Council of Economic Advisors, public comment, expert peer
review, and formal interagency review."
40
At its core, Circular A-4 attempts to communicate to agency officials
how the OMB prefers executive branch offices to construct their regulatory
analyses. 41 Every analysis should contain three central elements: "(1) a
statement of the need for the proposed action, (2) an examination of
alternative approaches, and (3) an evaluation of the benefits and costs-
32 For a description of these orders, see LUBBERS, supra note 2, at 32-33.
33 Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008).
34 Id. § 1(a).
35 Roger G. Noll, The Economic Significance of Executive Order 13,422, 25 YALE J. ON REG.
113, 114 (2008).
36 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 pmbl. (1996),. available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html.
37 Id.
38 See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Dir., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs,
to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (June 19, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/mOl-23.html.
39 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 24 (2003)
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR A-4], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/circulars/aOO4/a-4.pdf.
40 John D. Graham, Valuing the Future: OMB's Refined Position, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 51
(2007).
41 For the most comprehensive scholarly overview of Circular A-4's requirements, see
Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's Stalled
Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 12-17 (2006).
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quantitative and qualitative-of the proposed action and the main
alternatives."' 42 This Note focuses primarily on Circular A-4's third
requirement and the manner in which OMB recommends that agencies
conduct such evaluations. Specifically, OMB requires agencies to explicate
their benefit methodology, identify the relevant baseline, and predict
expected side effects. 43 Circular A-4 also urges agencies to acknowledge
benefits and costs that the regulator cannot quantify or easily monetize.44
Once the analysis is complete, OMB will compare the proposed net benefits
to non-quantified costs and benefits. 45
At a macro level, OMB outlines two broad approaches: benefit-cost
analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). 46 BCA aims to determine a
single number-the net social benefit of a regulation-by monetizing and
aggregating all quantifiable costs and benefits of the regulation. 47 In
contrast, CEA compares the net impact of multiple regulatory options that
achieve the same policy deliverable. 48 Circular A-4 suggests that, when
possible, agencies employ both techniques, though CEA is particularly
recommended for regulations affecting health and safety because the
associated benefits are typically challenging to monetize in a meaningful
way.49 OMB provides detail concerning the computation of benefits and
costs and the "best practices" regarding the valuation of uncertain
outcomes. Simply put, Circular A-4's guidance is premised upon an
opportunity-cost model, employing willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept values to calculate opportunity costs.5 0
Though Circular A-4 provides best practices and an introduction to
BCA, it provides neither a sense of the rich theoretical foundations of BCA
nor exhaustive detail on the techniques that comprise traditional benefit-
cost methodology. The following sections provide a more complete
account of both those topics.
42 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 2.
43 Id. at 2-3.
44 Id. at 3 ("A complete regulatory analysis includes a discussion of non-quantified as
well as quantified benefits and costs. A non-quantified outcome is a benefit or cost that has not
been quantified or monetized in the analysis. When there are important non-monetary values at
stake, you should also identify them in your analysis so policymakers can compare them with the
monetary benefits and costs.").
45 Id.; see John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 395, 524 (2008).
46 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 9.
47 For an expansive treatment of the prominent methodologies of all forms of BCA, see
E.l. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION (4th ed. 1988).
48 For a similarly thorough discussion of CEA, see COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND
MEDICINE (Marthe R. Gold et al. eds., 1996).
49 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 9-10; Matthew D. Adler, QALYS and Policy
Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2006).
50 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 18.
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B. Theoretical Justifications of Benefit-Cost Analysis
Since its earliest prominent use,5 1 the government has employed BCA
to provide a "pragmatic instrumento" that would mitigate three problems:
"poor priority setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to the
unfortunate side effects of regulation."5 2 BCA also sought to aggregate
preferences, which would ameliorate individuals' comparatively poor
ability to estimate risk and value outcomes.5 3 Ultimately, BCA provides a
tool for the government to make a persuasive case for intervening in the
market economy-a principle that animates much of Circular A-4.
Assuming that, as E.O. 12,866 asserts, there should be a presumption
against government action, analysts must construct BCAs within a
framework that considers markets to be the most efficient allocators of
resources, while recognizing the possibility that markets can fail.5
4
As many have argued, there are two principal instances in which the
government can overcome its presumption against regulatory action.55
First, the government can act to allocate resources where the market fails
to allocate those resources in accordance with individuals' preferences.
This problem typically involves inefficiencies created by public goods,
externalities, or monopolies.5 6 Second, the government can act to
distribute incomes through taxing and spending that may be justified by
preexisting social inequalities. Such programs include Social Security,
public education, and Medicaid. Depending on one's philosophical beliefs
concerning the role of government, one could endlessly debate the relative
quantity of interventions that should occur.5 7 Ideally, however, analysts
should employ BCAs to assess whether proposed action of either type is
welfare-enhancing. The theories that justify these "objective" assessments
stem from two primary schools of thought: welfare economics and
microeconomics.
1. Welfare Economics
The welfare economics tradition is rooted in the old maxim,
developed by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, which suggests that
government action is justified if it hurts no one and improves the welfare
51 BCA became prominent during the 1970s with the increased prominence of
environmental legislation and regulation. see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 3-6 (2002).
52 Id. at 6.
53 See id at 9.
54 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 pmbl. ("[P]rivate markets are the best engine for
economic growth.").
55 See, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 28 (2d ed. 1999).
56 See id.
57 See id. at 28-29.
Yale Journal on Regulation
of at least one person.5 8 Contemporary scholars regard the Pareto
principle as an ideal formulation that has little practical relevance, as
almost any conceivable government action imposes a cost on someone.5 9
Its sustained prominence stems from the hypothetical ability of a policy's
beneficiaries (the economic "winners") to compensate those harmed by
the policy (the economic "losers") through "side payments" external to the
government action. Permitting this modification can result in outcomes
that satisfy the Pareto principle. 60 Given that these "side payments" do not
occur in reality, Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks reformulated the Pareto
criteria into the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency principle, which states that
policies are socially beneficial if the winners could theoretically
compensate the losers, such that the policy creates no net losers. In other
words, "Adopt only policies that have positive net benefits." 61
Iteration is an implicit presumption that underlies Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. Individuals do not actually receive compensation after the
government issues a new rule that harms them. To be equitable, the theory
requires a long-term view. Over time, the costs and benefits of regulation
will be distributed, making all in society winners and losers at various
times. 62 Iteration should result in increased individual welfare for all
members of society after a sufficiently large number of policies have been
enacted. Finally, though this welfare economics framework does not
explicitly address distributional concerns, if the government engages in
many wealth-creating actions, the inefficiency associated with transfers
may be less significant as a share of total social welfare.
63
2. Microeconomics
The microeconomic framework considers most explicitly the
imperfect allocation of resources that results from the market's failure to
internalize externalities and to account for parties with market power. 64
Because markets only account for the aggregated prices that individuals
perceive, a purely market-based approach results in underconsumption of
goods that positively affect non-consumers and overconsumption of goods
that impose external costs. Microeconomic theory suggests that such
58 See generally VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred
N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1906) (presenting the
original formulation).
59 See GRAMLICH, supra note 55, at 30.
60 See MICHAEL C. MUNGER, ANALYZING POLICY: CHOICES, CONFLICTS, AND PRACTICES 355
(2000).
61 ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 29 (2d ed.
2001).
62 See id. at 30.
63 See id.
64 See GRAMLICH, supra note 55, at 33-36.
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examples of market failure justify government intervention to reduce the
resultant deadweight loss. 65 Paul Samuelson first explicated this approach
in the 1950s. 66 Accordingly, the quantity at which the market efficiently
internalizes external price information-and, thus, the quantity at which
the marginal social cost equals the marginal social benefit-is sometimes
known as the Samuelsonian Point.67 BCA seeks to quantify the inefficiency
of the status quo, as well as the benefits from "internalizing" these
externalities, by reaching the Samuelsonian Point and the associated costs
of the intervention.
68
To that end, the welfare economics tradition informs the
microeconomic approach, in that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can serve as the
relevant criterion for assessing the value of correcting market failure. 69
The principal goals of the two camps-welfarist and microeconomic-are
not necessarily coextensive, however, as the microeconomic approach
does not seek numerous opportunities for Kaldor-Hicks-like welfare
creation. Indeed, a pure microeconomic approach would justify
government intervention only in situations where information
asymmetries, externalities, or market power justify action, rather than
whenever there is an opportunity for net social wealth creation.
C. The Contemporary Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis
From the rich theory that spurred its development, BCA has become
routinized, as have the methods for culling the relevant data necessary for
these calculations. Consensus has formed that the relevant formulation for
net social benefit (NSB) comprises the sum of the changes in consumer
surplus, producer surplus, and net government revenues. 70 To simplify a
complex literature, economists generally define a consumer surplus as the
difference between the buyer's willingness-to-pay for a resource and the
price actually paid. 71 BCAs assume the consumer price paid is zero for
government-initiated outcomes, so the consumer surplus category
collapses into willingness-to-pay. Regulatory analysts multiply the
individual consumer surplus by the number of individuals affected to
determine the net consumer surplus. Producer surplus-the excess of
price over marginal cost-can be projected by evaluating whether the
government action will alter prevailing prices or change the quantities
65 Indeed, CircularA-4 makes this precise claim. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 4.
66 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387
(1954).
67 See GRAMLICH, supra note 55, at 33.
68 BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 2-3.
69 See id.; GRAMLICH, supra note 55, at 35-36.
70 See, e.g., BOARDMAN 1T AL., supra note 61, at 67; see also MUNGER, supra note 60, at 356.
71 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (7th ed. 2003) (describing the
role of consumer surplus in the Kaldor-Hicks system).
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transacted in the market. 72 Evaluating the change in net government
revenues requires analysts to consider how the proposal would directly
change receipt of tax dollars and how the program will change other
habits, such as consumption, that also create revenues.
73
Prevailing prices in competitive markets undergird all BCAs. Agencies
constructing willingness-to-pay models look to the prices and quantities
revealed by the market to assess how a proposed regulation will affect
consumer and producer surpluses. Where prices are not easily available,
agencies can construct "implicit prices" by extracting narrow cost data
from large markets. Where the market does not accurately reflect
competitive prices, agencies construct "shadow prices" that remove
subsidies, taxes, or other extraneous factors that distort prices. 74 OMB also
notes the possibility of wading into the revealed preferences literature in
suggesting that agencies consider relying on extrapolated data from
econometric studies. 75 Data derived from stated preference methods-the
asking of hypothetical questions regarding individuals' preferences for
various outcomes-also commonly serve as source materials for
regulatory analyses.76 Similar surveys that obtain non-monetized data
regarding health-utility values are commonly used in CEAs.
77
Before they can begin assessing costs, benefits, and alternatives,
agencies must first-and arguably most importantly-establish the
relevant baseline. 78 As most proposed regulations have ongoing impacts,
regulators must consider the future unregulated world when constructing
their model's baseline. OMB encourages agencies to evaluate their
proposal under differing baseline assumptions to account for uncertainty.
In addition, because benefits and costs accrue over time, OMB has outlined
extensive guidelines regarding the discounting of these figures to account
for society's preference for instantaneity and the availability of a market
for money (that is, interest rates).
79
72 See, e.g., MUNGER, supra note 60, at 237 n.16.
73 See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 97-98.
74 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 21.
75 See id. at 20-21. The revealed preferences literature-in which scholars attempt to
ascertain socially optimal choices by observing consumer behavior-is vast. See, e.g., Damien
Brousolle, Internal Consistency of Choice, Sen and the Spirit of Revealed Preferences: A Behaviorist
Approach, 34 J. Socio-ECON. 605 (2005); W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through
Contingent Valuation, 1. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2004, at 19; Peter Knez, Vernon L. Smith & Arlington W.
Williams, Individual Rationality, Market Rationality and Value Estimation, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 397
(1985); Kevin C. Urama & Ian D. Hodge, Are Stated Preferences Convergent with Revealed
Preferences?, 59 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 24 (2006).
76 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 22.
77 See Adler, supra note 49, at 5-6.
78 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 15-16.
79 See id. at 31. An extensive literature exists on discount rates in general and the
specific rates recommended by the government. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Discounting, Morality
and Gaming, in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 13-21 (Paul R. Portney & John P.
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Additionally, the government creates BCAs under enormous
uncertainty relating to future prices, interest rates, economic growth,
preferences, and a host of other factors that complicate the present
analysis. To demonstrate the relative weight of uncertain variables to the
analysis, OMB encourages agencies to conduct sensitivity analyses to
demonstrate the impact on NSB of changes to uncertain variables. 8 0 This
Note examines how each assumption renders the analysis liable to
critique.
II. Incorporating the Insights of Behavioral Economics and Hedonic
Adaptation into Regulatory Analysis
As noted above, contemporary regulatory analysis operates under the
assumptions of neoclassical economics. Economists, however, have
repeatedly and with increased vigor since the 1990s begun to challenge
these assumptions as unreflective of actual human behavior. Indeed, the
field of behavioral economics has developed to inform traditional
economics by refining its assumptions through the incorporation of data
from replicable observations of actual behavior. Just as this behavioral
approach has advanced economic thought, the same approach has
informed the economic analysis of law, which, as Christine Jolls, Cass
Sunstein, and Richard Thaler have written, more frequently involves non-
market behavior.8 1
This field has deep relevance for the study of regulatory policy, and
this Part attempts to contextualize its potential applications and consider
the benefits of such an approach. Section II.A considers the evolution of
this field, its assumptions, and its applicability to the law, as well as its
overall qualities and shortcomings. Section II.B considers how new
hedonic metrics that have been developed in the behavioral economic
tradition to measure subjective well-being and happiness may offer a
uniform, consistent, and equitable approach to regulatory analysis. Section
II.C examines specifically how the government might apply these hedonic
metrics to create benefit-cost analyses that more accurately capture how
individuals will experience the impact of proposed regulation.
A. The Behavioral Approach and the Movement from Neoclassicism
Behavioral economists design studies to uncover principles of human
behavior. Rather than assuming elements of human behavior and then
Weyant eds., 1999); David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the
Future: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 433 (2009).
80 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 3.
81 Christine lolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998).
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theorizing from those assumptions, behavioralists seek to understand
actual behavior first and consider then how those findings may inform
economic theory and practice. The aggregation of years of such studies has
evinced profound weaknesses in the assumptions that undergird
traditional economic thought. As first generalized by Thaler, the field
primarily diverges from neoclassicism because of the realization that
humans exhibit three qualities that defy neoclassical assumptions:
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.82
Bounded rationality suggests that human beings are incapable of
obtaining and processing the multitude of information necessary to make
perfectly rational decisions.8 3 To put it simply, "cognitive abilities are not
infinite."8 4 This theory also captures individuals' unwillingness to exert the
amount of effort required to make fully rational choices.8 5 Actors will
frequently make decisions through heuristics or "mental shortcuts" that
may have not accounted for all possible outcomes or may have done so
with inaccurate probabilities.8 6 Whereas neoclassical economic thought
presumes that individuals will rationally internalize all the costs of an
event, behavioral economics suggests that there are significant limitations
on human capacity to operate at that level.
8 7
Bounded willpower denotes individuals' propensity to act in a
manner discordant with their long-term individual interest.8 8 Examples of
drug addiction comprise the most obvious instances of bounded
willpower, wherein individuals sacrifice long-term health for short-term
psychic or hedonic benefits.89 Applying Richard Posner's original
formulation, Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen have referred to this
behavior as the "multiple-selves problem," through which they conceive of
individual decisionmaking as a composite of future preference sets. 90
82 Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus, in FOUNDATIONS OF
RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: How Do ECONOMISTS Do ECONOMICS? 227 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J.
Samuels eds., 1996); see also Christine lolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115, 121-26 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007)
(describing these three elements in greater depth); loils et al., supra note 81, at 1477-79 (same).
83 See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in MODELS
OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261, 270-71 (1957); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded
Rationality, in 2 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 408,411 (1982).
84 lolls et al., supra note 81, at 1477-78.
85 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-76 (2000).
86 See Gowri Ramachandran, Antisubordination, Rights, and Radicalism, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1045, 1055-57 (2008).
87 For a more expansive discussion of bounded rationality, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND
REASON 254-66 (2002).
88 See lolls et al., supra note 81, at 1479.
89 See, e.g., Ole-Jorgen Skog, Addiction, Choice, and Irrationality, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 111, 135 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
90 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 85, at 1119-24; see Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or
Multiple Selves?: Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23 (1997).
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Behavioralists also attempt to explain criminal behavior as an extreme
instance of bounded willpower, wherein criminals engage in "hyperbolic
discounting" to justify their actions. 91
Bounded self-interest contravenes the neoclassical assumption that
individuals act solely in their own self-interest when making decisions.
92
Diverging from the traditional assumption that an individual acts solely to
maximize her utility function, behavioralists cite voluminous evidence that
people generally consider the well-being of others when making decisions.
Indeed, individuals are commonly willing to sacrifice personal utility to
benefit those they perceive as cooperative, 93 and social norms tend to
influence behavior far more than neoclassical assumptions would
suggest.94 This element of behavioralism exceeds pure altruism and
suggests that individuals will be both "nicer" and "more spiteful" when
social norms so dictate.95
Beyond the three principal issues that Thaler originally identified,
behavioral economics has additionally challenged some of the other core
tenets of neoclassical thought. Behavioralists have focused prominently on
challenging the universality of the Coase Theorem by illustrating the
pervasive impact of endowment effects in preventing goods from flowing
to their most efficient uses. 96 The endowment effect describes an
individual's propensity to overvalue the retention of a currently owned
asset.9 7 A person may be able to sell an asset on the market for more than
he is willing to pay for the same item, yet he elects not to sell. This
"underweighting of opportunity costs" ensures that goods do not flow to
their optimal employment, contravening Coase's hypothesis that low
transaction costs will compel just that outcome.
98
Beyond the theoretical challenges that the behavioralists pose for
neoclassical economic thought, they also expose a significant weakness of
prevailing economic metrics-such as neoclassical benefit-cost
techniques-that rely on their assumptions. If economists know that
traditional metrics like measures of net social welfare are built upon
imperfect foundations, the relevance of the existing metric is at least
91 lolls et al., supra note 81, at 1539-41.
92 See id. at 1479.
93 See Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in
15Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 73 (2001).
94 See Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 973, 979 (2000).
95 lolls et al., supra note 81, at 1479.
96 See Jolls, supra note 82, at 117-21. The Coase Theorem suggests that in the absence of
transaction costs, bargaining should lead to an efficient allocation of resources irrespective of the
initial allocation. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
97 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect; Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 1. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 197-99.
98 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
39, 44 (1980).
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questionable. To address this challenge, social scientists have created new
"hedonic" metrics that incorporate these behavioral understandings and
seek to present a more accurate picture of how exogenous events, public
programs, or routine daily activities impact individuals in reality. The next
Section examines some of these metrics and explores their virtues and
flaws.
B. The New Hedonic Metrics
Drawing upon a vast psychology literature, economists have
analogized from existing survey data and designed new studies to examine
and measure actual behavior through the study of human happiness.
These developments have happened in some instances independent from
the behavioral economics trend but have been increasingly informed by,
and generative with, the new movement in the economics field. Indeed,
happiness data are now "being used to tackle important questions in
economics." 99 This research has sought to describe human behavior by
seeking to understand how individuals process information and
experience changed circumstances. The results of this research and the
metrics the field has developed comprise the content of this Section.100
Diverging from traditional revealed preference and contingent
valuation models, which focus on creating a monetized equivalent for any
event's impact, scholars have developed new metrics that seek to measure
various forms of happiness. 101 These metrics fall largely into two
categories: (1) measures of self-reported subjective well-being; 102 and
(2) measures of self-reported moment-to-moment affect.'0 3 The former
consider more global considerations and are holistic life assessments,
whereas the latter consider happiness on a more instantaneous level. The
salient differences between these two tools become apparent when
considering the contrasting results of studies employing both metrics,
which assessed people with children versus those without children. These
99 Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, I.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 25,43.
100 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1516 (2008); Rick Swedloff &
Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2010)
(discussing the relevance of adaptation theory to legal analysis), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354234.
101 See Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875 (2006).
102 See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain
and the USA, 88 J. PuB. ECON. 1359 (2004); David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in
California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SC.
340 (1998).
103 See, e.g., Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Very Happy People, 13 PSYCHOL. Sc. 81
(2002).
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studies show that the childless have higher moment-to-moment affect, 104
whereas parents have a higher sense of overall subjective well-being.105
That is, at any given moment, people with children may feel worse than
those without children, but those same people have a greater overall sense
of life satisfaction. This result does not indicate that these methods are
necessarily flawed. To the contrary, this divergence demonstrates the
general principle that events may have high moment-to-moment costs yet
impart holistic benefits.
The study of self-reported life satisfaction data originated in
psychology, with economists beginning to draw upon several longitudinal,
multinational studies that had asked some variant of the following
question: "Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life as a
whole? Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied, or not at all satisfied?"'1 6 Such life satisfaction data provide a rich
source for analysis, particularly given that the data also have been coded
with income factors, familial information (such as marital status and
whether one has children), and in some cases, health information. This
question seeks to ascertain a global report of one's overall perceived well-
being-rather than an assessment of how things are in the immediate
instance. Contrasting life satisfaction with moment-to-moment affect,
Daniel Kahneman wrote, "Life satisfaction reflects the global
circumstances of the individual's life (marital status, income), but
happiness reflects the hedonic value of the activities and social
interactions to which she allocates her time."
107
Reports of life satisfaction have been shown, however, to be
susceptible to focusing illusions, such as was reported in a study by David
Schkade and Kahneman in which respondents reported higher expected
satisfaction in California than the Midwest, despite there being no
perceptible difference in reported actual data.108 Moreover, studies have
demonstrated that while increasing an individual's income increases his
happiness, population-wide increases-that is, changes that increase
population-wide wealth with no relative increases-do not result in
population-wide increased happiness; this outcome suggests that people
derive happiness from their relative wealth, not their absolute wealth. 109
Indeed, "the belief that high income is associated with good mood
104 See Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Inequality and Happiness:
Are Europeans and Americans Different?, 88 1. PuB. ECON. 2009, 2020 (2004).
105 See Luis Angeles, Children and Life Satisfaction, J. HAPPINESS STUD.,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a34114m070112044/fulltext.pdf.
106 Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Income of All Increase the Happiness of All?, 27 J.
EcON. BEHAV. &ORG. 35, 39 (1995).
107 Daniel Kahneman et al., The Structure of Well-Being in Two Cities 1 (Aug. 22, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation),
108 Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 102.
109 See Easterlin, supra note 106, at 35.
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is... mostly illusory."110 Other studies indicate that income equality in
societies may generally contribute to comparatively lower social
happiness, even when controlling for income levels of individuals.'
Kahneman and others have cautioned against over-reliance on subjective
well-being, as the data are dependent on the proximity of the survey to
circumstances that would alter people's assessments."12 To mitigate this
concern, Kahneman has proposed the "U-index," which will not only
account for intensity of dissatisfaction but also for the duration spent in a
dissatisfied state."
3
Measures of moment-to-moment affect also spring from the work of
Kahneman and his various co-authors. He began this work by drawing a
sharp distinction between "decision utility," by which individuals weigh
the impact of a decision, and "experienced utility," through which
individuals derive hedonic value from any action." 4 Ed Diener and Martin
Seligman refined this work through the construction of several metrics
that may be employed to measure happiness-including questioning
individuals about how they experience eight specific positive and sixteen
specific negative emotions on a daily basis.' 15 More recently, Kahneman
has developed a new tool for assessing affect, the day reconstruction
method (DRM), by which individuals "systematically reconstruct their
activities ... with procedures designed to reduce recall biases."" 6 Because
DRM's results have been highly correlated with more costly survey
methods, DRM presents a promising tool for producing reliable data about
moment-to-moment affect."1
7
Through extensive study, these instruments have also revealed what
may be an enormously counterintuitive conclusion: people adapt
profoundly to positively- and negatively-changed circumstances. One
study famously reported that lottery winners adapt quickly to their new
wealth; indeed, they exhibited no additional happiness compared to a
control group." 8 The same study observed that the happiness of accident
victims who have become paraplegics similarly adapts quickly after time
110 Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing
Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 1908 (2006).
111 See Alesina et al., supra note 104.
112 See Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of
Subjective Well-Being, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 3, 8, 14.
113 See id. at 18-21.
114 Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations
of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997).
115 See Diener & Seligman, supra note 103, at 81.
116 See Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience:
The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM), 306 SCIENCE 1776 (2004).
117 See id. at 1776, 1780.
118 Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie lanoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and Accident
Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
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has passed since their injuries. 119 This "setpoint" understanding of
happiness suggests that individual happiness is a constant, and changed
circumstances only result in brief deviations from a pre-established
level, 120 leading some to argue that one's happiness is "primarily a matter
of chance."'
21
The data, however, are not uniform on this point. One study reported
that though populations generally exhibit a tendency toward adaptation,
many individuals who demonstrate particularly significant reactions to
events do not ever fully equilibrate. 122 The study's authors argue that
though significant adaptation undeniably occurs, "life circumstances are
necessary" to understand subjective well-being, and "all happiness is not
due to [preexisting] temperament." 23 Others have found evidence that
life-changing events, like unemployment, alter satisfaction, and that the
unemployed do not return to their ex ante level of satisfaction even after
an individual becomes reemployed. 124 Divorce results in similar inability
to return to one's supposed setpoint.125 Other studies have shown that the
severely disabled exhibit significant, though incomplete, adaptation.
126
Notwithstanding these critiques of perfect adaptation, adaptation
undeniably occurs at least partially, and regulators should not design BCAs
assuming its absence.
C. Happiness Metrics in Benefit-Cost Analysis
Despite the proliferation of these metrics, a core challenge remains-
creating a useful translation between the happiness measures and
traditional measures of economic cost. If the government can determine
that a regulation will cost the United States $100 million in lost production
but increase net social happiness by a certain amount, how should the
government determine whether that regulation is worthwhile? Some
initial research has sought to monetize happiness results, though work on
119 See id.
120 See Philip Brickman & Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good
Society, in ADAPTATION-LEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287 (M.H. Appley ed., 1971).
121 David Lykken & Auke Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI
186, 189 (1996).
122 See Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of
Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 1. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 527, 538
(2003).
123 Id.
124 Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15
PSYCHOL. Scl. 8, 11 (2004).
125 Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction
andAdaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945, 947 (2005).
126 See Andrew 1. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists andJudges, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1061,
1072 (2008).
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this front remains dramatically incomplete. 127 The general approach has
been to examine how changes in income similarly affect people's
happiness-controlling for wealth levels and other relevant variables-
and to extrapolate income adjustments that would create similar levels of
happiness. 128 Just as the assumptions that underlie neoclassical metrics
remain susceptible to critique, any attempt to equate happiness units to
dollars remains similarly vulnerable. To incorporate these metrics into
benefit-cost analysis in a meaningful way will require both addressing
these weaknesses and understanding the instances in which these metrics
offer a superior tool to existing practice.
An alternative exists to the proposed monetization of happiness.
Treating the happiness inquiry as a separate, supplemental investigation
to the neoclassical approach might add the most constructive amount of
information to the analysis, rather than attempting to equate the two. In so
doing, one can imagine that regulators would treat hedonic metrics in
precisely the same manner that they currently employ traditional metrics,
such as monetized measures of human health. At first, the regulators need
to establish the relevant baseline level of happiness in the status quo
period. This would require conducting surveys of the covered population
to ascertain preexisting levels of happiness. Once the agency has
determined the appropriate baseline, they should project how the
regulation will affect that baseline. This is, of course, easier said than done.
Nevertheless, one can intuit this procedure from how such projections
operate currently. Regulators search for naturally occurring or other
regulated instances in which the proposed outcome has transpired.
Measurements of those affected populations may serve as representative
samples for the proposed assessment. Much like current regulatory
analysis, regulators can apply discount rates to contextualize future
hedonic harms and benefits in future periods.
At their most useful, hedonic metrics should comprise an
accompanying set of evaluative tools in addition to existing hedonic
approaches. There are both normative and practical reasons for this
judgment. First, political actors are likely to still demand monetized
estimates of regulatory costs. It is difficult to envision a rapid and
wholesale shift from decades of pecuniary valuation to an exclusively
hedonic approach. Second, hedonic metrics, like the neoclassical tools, are
not perfect and cannot independently capture all effects of regulation. As
the case studies of Part III demonstrate, hedonic metrics have difficulty
accounting for the regulatory costs imposed on legal entities, like
corporations, and on widely diffused groups. In combination with existing
127 See BERNARD M.S. VAN PRAAG &ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, HAPPINESS QUANTIFIED (2007).
128 See, e.g., id. at 233.
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tools, however, the utilization of hedonic metrics will help to present the
most complete assessment possible of regulatory impacts.
III. An Examination of Contemporary Practice and Recommendations for
Change
Contemporary benefit-cost practice admirably captures the explicit
and implicit quantifiable effects of regulation. This Note suggests, however,
that those effects may only tell part of the story of a regulation's impact
because neoclassical assumptions about human behavior may undermine
the analysis's conclusion. Moving away from the abstract, this Part
considers three case studies of RIA that accompanied regulations with
significant economic impact. This Part includes three regulations with
diverse impacts and attempts to present a composite of all tools currently
employed in regulatory analysis. Section III.A examines a fairly typical
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation intending to reduce air
pollution under the Clean Air Act. Section III.B considers a Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rule regarding the inspection,
evaluation, and abatement of lead paint in federally subsidized housing.
Section III.C evaluates a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
regulation regarding the mandatory transmission of passenger manifests
in advance of departure for flights inbound to the United States. This Part
concludes by attempting to generalize new government best practices that
may result from incorporating hedonic metrics into regulatory analysis.
A. EPA Mobile Source Air Toxins Regulation
This Section considers the RIA that the EPA constructed to
accompany its 2007 final rule, Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Mobile Sources.129 The EPA enacted this regulation pursuant to three
statutory provisions related to the regulation of air pollution:
(1) section 202 of the Clean Air Act, which charges the EPA with regulating
permissible emission levels from mobile sources and establishing
standards for new automobile and engine production; 130 (2) section 183,
which requires the EPA to enumerate all products that contribute at least
80% of the volatile organic compound emissions in specified areas of the
United States;131 and (3) section 1504(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
which charges the EPA to set emissions baselines for refineries to reflect
new levels of fuel quality. 132 The final rule adopted standards for "gasoline,
passenger vehicles, and portable fuel containers (primarily gas cans) that
129 72 Fed. Reg. 8428 (Feb. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 59,80,85, 86).
130 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006).
131 See id. § 7511d.
132 See Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1504(b), 119 Stat. 594, 1077 (2005).
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will significantly reduce emissions of benzene and other hazardous air
pollutants." 
133
The EPA estimates that the core components of this regulation will
have a total social cost of $359.4 million in 2020 and $400 million in
2030.134 In this analysis, the EPA relied on traditional market data for
determination of these figures, such as the amount that gasoline prices will
increase due to higher refining standards, increased engineering costs that
firms will incur during product design, and lost consumer surplus due to
lower consumption of goods that will result from higher prices. 135 These
calculations were predicated on existing studies of market data and
consumer behavior. This RIA sought to account for all potential economic
costs of the regulation. 136
In contrast to its cost analysis, the EPA's benefit analysis purposely
does not quantify many of the regulation's stated benefits. 137 Specifically,
it accounts for benefits deriving from effects that have well-established
avoided cost figures-such as premature mortality, emergency room
visits, lost productivity, and asthma exacerbations-but does not quantify
benefits resulting from outcomes that have less clear economic costs-
such as regional visibility improvements and odor abatement.1 38 With a
7% discount rate, they assess the program will have benefits of $3 billion +
B in 2020 and $5.7 billion + B in 2030, where B represents the value of the
unquantified benefits. 139 Approximately 90% of the monetized benefits
stem from reductions in mortality risk; the remaining benefits arise from
reduced chronic illness and hospital admissions. 4 0 Naturally, the EPA
asserts that the impact of the unquantified benefits on the final analysis
depends on their magnitudes but notes that their omission "lends a
downward bias" to the benefits presented. 141
Incorporating hedonic metrics into this analysis would add detail and
probative value to the EPA's assessment of benefits. This is not to suggest
that the EPA shirked its responsibilities for complying with existing
133 72 Fed. Reg. at 8428.
134 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM MOBILE
SOURCES: REGULATORY IMPACTANALYSIS, at ES-11 tbl.14 (2007) [hereinafter EPA RIA].
135 Id. at 9-1.
136 Id.
137 Leaving all or most of a regulation's benefits unquantified is common. See, e.g., DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., REGULATORY ASSESSMENT: CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM STANDARDS INTERIM
FINAL RULE 89 (2007) (calculating only the costs of heightened chemical plant safety standards);
TRANS. SAFETY ADMIN., REGULATORY EVALUATION-FINAL RULE: SECURE FLIGHT (49 C.F.R. § 1560), at 8
(2007) (monetizing none of the benefits associated with an airline security rule and then
conducting a needed-risk-reduction analysis based upon the Department of Transportation's
statistical value of a life of $5.7 million).
138 EPA RIA, supra note 134, at 12-6 to 12-8 tbl.12.1-2.
139 Id. at 12-21 tbl.12.4-2.
140 Id. at 12-22.
141 Id. at 12-23.
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procedures. To the contrary, this analysis was approved by 0IRA and
follows all existing best practices in contemporary benefit-cost
procedures. 142 Nevertheless, one only need consider the inclusion of the
amorphous variable B as a central component of the EPA's benefit calculus
to recognize that additional considerations-namely, of how the reduced
effects of pollution affect well-being-might result in a more complete
account of the regulation's impact. What follows presumes the existence of
data that has not been collected and merely suggests a path that the EPA
might take in the future if it were conducting a similar exercise.
First, because chronic conditions have been shown to have a
significant hedonic impact,143 their reduction or elimination may provide
significant gains in happiness that could increasingly buttress the
argument for regulation. A rule such as the EPA's that seeks to mitigate
chronic conditions would likely have a far more "beneficial" impact if it
included hedonic measurements in addition to its existing economic
calculus. In other words, the existing economic account only captures the
quantifiable costs of chronic conditions-medication, lost productivity,
and hospital visitation-whereas a hedonic account would seek to
represent the costs borne by those continually suffering through chronic
conditions beyond their out-of-pocket expenses. Additionally, the hedonic
account attempts to capture the longevity of continual psychic costs
associated with chronic conditions, while the contemporary account
assesses only the discrete costs of medical expenses and job-related
productivity losses.
Second, because studies have shown that consumers adapt
profoundly to changes in income, 144 the use of hedonic metrics may
suggest that negative income effects may have small hedonic costs. From
the neoclassical perspective, lost consumer surplus undeniably results
from facing increased prices for needed goods such as gasoline.
Consumers, however, are resilient and adapt quickly to that negative
income effect. Although consumer surplus has fallen, hedonic research
suggests that consumers will likely equilibrate quickly in budgeting
differently given higher prices. This is not at all to suggest that benefit-cost
analyses should ignore income effects. Indeed, this very result
demonstrates that this is not an acceptable approach to use exclusively.
The hedonic data suggest, however, that regulators should contextualize
these costs with competing benefits by acknowledging how individuals
will actually experience those effects. If income effects purportedly
outweigh some benefit, regulators should consider the evidence that
142 Indeed, because of the regulation's overwhelming ratio of benefits to costs, few
would consider this exercise an unreasonable use of regulatory authority.
143 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 1. LEGAL STUD. S157 (2008).
144 See Kahneman et al., supra note 110.
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suggests that consumers resiliently adapt to changes in income. 145 In
fairness, ample research also suggests that individuals adapt to changes in
their health as well, though severe changes in health result in less
complete adaptation.146
Third, the relative availability of data pertaining to costs, which will
be primarily borne by the regulated industry, may indicate that the EPA
has been at least somewhat prone to agency capture in this instance. In
contrast, the diffused benefits to individuals were more challenging to
quantify because of a lack of readily available data. Incorporating hedonic
metrics in analyses affecting large, diffused, heterogeneous populations
may provide a way to balance the interests more evenly. The hedonic
approach does not represent a substitute for traditional accounting of
economic benefits, but it ensures that there is at least some accounting of
how individuals will experience the effects of the rule in reality. Although
the degree to which an accounting of those hedonic measurements might
be balanced against economic costs remains debatable, 147 simply put,
more information is superior to less when designing ideal regulatory
policy.
Fourth, as a general matter, the EPA might develop baseline levels of
subjective well-being for various areas of the country, particularly because
of the Clean Air Act's focus on regional effects and the existence of differing
ambient air quality standards for different parts of the country.
Additionally, beginning to track the hedonic effects of various mortality
and morbidity reductions would be relevant for and could be incorporated
into almost every RIA prepared by the EPA.
In contrast to the benefit methodology, hedonic metrics likely would
not produce many additionally actionable conclusions relating to the EPA's
cost methodology. Their analysts constructed a robust analysis of
economic factors affected by the regulation-notably the higher
production costs faced by firms-that captures the bulk of the regulation's
economic costs. The costs of the regulation were immediately clear to the
regulators, and extensive data existed to provide useful cost estimates,
such that the EPA felt confident in asserting that it had accounted for all
potential costs of the rule.
This reality raises a question for the relevance of hedonic measures in
assessing firm health. On one hand, a firm might be considered as the
composite of its shareholders, who derive wealth and happiness from the
firm's revenues, as its employees derive happiness from maintaining their
jobs. On the other hand, these benefits may be considered only secondary
effects. Firms experience economic costs as a singular entity, and hedonic
145 See, e.g., Brickman et al., supra note 118.
146 See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 126.
147 See supra Section II.C.
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metrics fail to have relevance when describing how regulations might
impact legal entities, rather than human beings as individuals. This
challenge persists not only because an enormous portion of the economy
appears beyond assessment by these tools, but also because of the
difficulty in comparing the results of measures that actually gauge firm-
level impacts with hedonic tools that do not. At present, therefore, hedonic
metrics seem incapable of providing the sole calculus by which one could
assess the impact of a proposed regulation if the importance of impacts to
legal entities remains central to the analysis. Still, they remain useful in
other regulations in which the primary costs and benefits are borne
directly by individuals.
B. HUD Lead Paint Regulation
In 1999, HUD enacted a regulation seeking to ensure that federally
funded housing "does not pose lead-based paint hazards to young
children."148 Congress compelled HUD to regulate pursuant to the
Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992,149 which
greatly broadened the definition of a "lead-based paint hazard" to include
many previously unregulated substances and quantities of lead-based
products. The statute explicitly authorized new regulations related to
evaluating these hazards, forming risk assessments, and implementing
abatement programs.'5 0 HUD's final rule applies to all federally supported
housing stock built before 1978-the year Congress banned lead paint-
and requires system-wide housing inspections, mandates testing of dust
for the presence of lead, outlines procedures to be followed during
inspections and testing, and details abatement procedures.' 5 1
HUD asserts that the regulation will impose $99.5 million in costs
related to evaluations and $153.7 million in costs related to hazard
reduction. 5 2 HUD obtained cost data from market-based sources (such as
the prevailing prices for new windows and lead-free paint) and from
estimates arising from a HUD task force on lead abatement (such as
estimated values of the labor required to conduct inspections and
148 Requirements for Notification, Evaluation and Reduction of Lead-Based Paint
Hazards in Federally Owned Residential Property and Housing Receiving Federal Assistance, 64
Fed. Reg. 50,140 (Sept. 15, 1999) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 24 C.F.R. (2000))
[hereinafter HUD FRI.
149 Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1003, 106 Stat. 3897 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
4851, 4851a, 4851b (2006)).
150 42 U.S.C. § 4851(b).
151 24 c.F.R. §§ 35.106, .110,.125, .140.
152 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL RULE ON LEAD-BASED
PAINT, at ES-7 (1999) [hereinafter HUD RIA].
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abatements). 153 The labor values were also informed by an existing HUD
lead abatement program that had executed similar tasks. 154
HUD reports that over the life of the regulation, it will produce $1.143
billion in benefits under a 3% discount rate, which results in $890 million
in net benefits, and $324 million in benefits under a 7% discount rate,
which results in $71 million in net benefits. Unlike the EPA, HUD has
monetized almost all its anticipated benefits from this regulation.SS The
majority of the rule's benefits stem from "[r]eductions in medical costs;
[r]eductions in special education costs; and [i]ncreased lifetime earnings
associated with higher cognitive abilities."'1 6 HUD exempts from its
quantified benefits a monetization of chronic adult conditions, such as
hypertension, because of "considerable scientific debate" about their
correlation with childhood lead exposure.' 5 7 HUD relies on Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention data and other scholarly sources that
correlate IQ loss to lead exposure and then extrapolate a financial cost
from research that has correlated IQ level with income level.' 5 8 Medical
and special education costs are drawn from existing government data.
The structure of this regulation leads to a common pattern-though
unique among the three regulations presented in this Note-whereby the
costs of the regulation all are borne in year one, while the benefits accrue
for the life of the regulation. 159 The net costs, therefore, are unaffected by
the discount rate selected, while the benefits are extremely sensitive to the
discount rate. HUD accordingly conducted its analysis and presented
results for the 0MB-recommended 7% and 3% discount rates. 60
Additionally, because existing lead abatement regulations existed, the HUD
analysis appropriately accounts only for the marginal cost of the new rule
from the existing regulatory baseline and for the marginal benefits of the
heightened standards. 161
Hedonic theory counsels that the government should review the
method by which it selects the appropriate discount rate for regulatory
review. 162 If discount rates are understood to include a composite of the
time value of money (the interest rate) and society's preference for
153 See id. at 2-22 to 2-34.
154 Id. at 2-39 to 2-40.
155 Id at 3-44.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 3-51.
158 Id. at 3-45 to 3-51. To specify, the data suggests that 0.245 points of IQ are lost for
each 1 ug/dL increase in blood lead level. That level of IQ loss results in a net present value of
$544 in income loss per child at a discount rate of 7%. Id. at 3-45 to 3-46.
159 See id. at ES-3.
160 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 39, at 33.
161 See HUD RIA, supra note 152, at 2-25.
162 For a comprehensive review of the general tenets of discounting and hedonic
adaptation theory, see Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL BEING:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 303 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
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instantaneity (the reason the discount rate exceeds prevailing interest
rates), hedonic adaptation theory suggests this rate may additionally need
to be inflated. Though the recent scholarship concerning happiness
metrics and benefit-cost analysis does not tackle this topic, 163 one can
envision that the happiness research should counsel in favor of a far higher
discount rate. If individuals only experience hedonic gains or losses in the
short term because of their ability to adapt, those changes should be
mitigated quickly as time progresses in the analysis. One might also
consider eliminating entirely changes that accrue slowly because
individuals adapt continuously, and thus those gains may have negligible
hedonic impact. According to the hedonic account, therefore, OIRA should
define a discount rate that is proportional to the speed of adaptation.
Considering the role of the discount rate in the HUD regulation
specifically, because such a large portion of the regulation's net benefits
occur in the years subsequent to implementation, behavioral research
suggests that those benefits may be overstated because of individuals'
propensity to adapt to changed circumstances. This research suggests that
individuals will adapt at least somewhat to disability and that perhaps
accordingly HUD has overstated the net benefit of its regulation. Indeed,
because the costs are borne in one period alone, less opportunity for
adaptation exists on the cost side because of the regulation's one-time
negative wealth effect. Although this kind of contextualization would not
likely render this regulation no longer socially beneficial under HUD's 3%
discount rate, it may present a more ambiguous case under the 7%
discount rate.
But there is something deeply unsettling-and even offensive-about
this conclusion. The United States should not regulate less because its
citizens will adapt to their lead-paint induced diminished intelligence and
earning potential. Surely a regulation that ensures cognitive development
and prevents future income loss should not be "penalized" because the
affected parties will adapt to their reduced capacities. Scholars might more
easily feel comfortable permitting a contextualization of the magnitude of
income loss due to the EPA regulation, but recognizing that benefits may
be overstated in this regulation follows less intuitively-and appropriately
so. Such a realization is another cogent justification for employing a
variety of metrics when assessing regulatory impacts due to the inherent
flaws in the assumptions of any approach. HUD's regulation produced
enormous net social benefit because of its profound positive income
effects in the years following the rule's implementation. Although it is
worth recognizing that people's subjective assessments of themselves
might equilibrate to any such changes, a regulatory structure that
163 See, e.g., Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 37 1. LEGAL STUD. S253 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 143.
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promotes wealth creation-or, in the alternative, abhors wealth
destruction-cannot deny that a more productive populace is socially
desirable. Happiness metrics by themselves fail catastrophically in this
instance.
This quandary relates profoundly to the "capabilities approach,"
which was discussed in the works of such scholars as Martha Nussbaum
164
and Amartya Sen, 165 and was refined specifically in this context by Cass
Sunstein.166 Referring to the human rights context, Sen defined capabilities
as "the opportunity to achieve valuable combinations of human
functionings: what a person is able to do or be."' 67 Sunstein asserted that
losses of such capabilities are "real and significant, even if hedonic metrics
are unable to capture [them]."' 68 These conclusions are supported by
ample data that individuals will willingly sacrifice wealth or years of life to
avoid outcomes with little or no hedonic effect. 169 The ability to contribute
meaningfully to the economy and society at one's born intelligence level
should qualify as a capability under Sen's and Sunstein's framework,
indicating that HUD's regulation not only seeks to maximize future income
levels but also to prevent capability loss. Assessing HUD's regulation
through this lens affirms HUD's initial estimate and diminishes the
significance of the hedonic adaptation effect.
In terms of the regulation's costs, much like the EPA rule, the costs
associated with the HUD rule likely would not be colored very differently
by employing a hedonic approach. Indeed, the analysts relied on existing
market data and the labor cost of undertaking the regulation's required
procedures. One can raise similar questions about the salience of the
hedonic methodology regarding impacts to firms, though in the case of
HUD, the bulk of the costs are more generalized. In other words, the
government, and thus indirectly the taxpayers, bear the cost of financing
the inspection and removal of lead in the covered homes.
It may be worth considering how the hedonic approach views matters
of taxation and deficit spending, though the HUD regulation likely does not
impose per capita social costs sufficient to have a significant impact on
human behavior. When considering larger programs or more expensive
164 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
(2000).
165 See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 330
(2004).
166 See Sunstein, supra note 143, at S175-77.
167 See Sen, supra note 165, at 332.
168 See Sunstein, supra note 143, at S176.
169 See id. at S177. Sunstein cites the persuasive studies of Loewenstein and Ubel, which
demonstrate dialysis patients would sacrifice half their remaining years to have healthy kidneys,
and that patients would sacrifice 15% of their remaining years to live without a colostomy. See
George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience
Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008).
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regulations, however, for which the cost of regulation is diffuse (that is,
financed by deficit spending in the current economy and thus borne by the
taxpayers over time through debt service), one can argue that citizens may
adapt over the years to this negative income effect. People's aggregated
ability to adjust may indicate little hedonic harm to significant deficit
spending and corresponding taxation or reduction in other government
services.
This argument reveals a core challenge to the adaptation camp, in
that the theory may be applied to justify massive changes, as having little
hedonic effect, so long as they occur slowly over a long period of time.
People's ability to habituate, so the argument might go, will render their
happiness relatively unaffected by small tax increases over time because
people recover quickly from income changes. Moreover, the research that
suggests that only relative income effects alter happiness and that only
society-wide changes have hedonic impacts would counsel in favor of
sweeping regulation that affects all citizens evenly. 170 Indeed, taken to its
full extreme, assuming a highly progressive system of taxation, massive
government spending that takes more income and wealth from the few
could have positive income effects due to its creation of a more
economically equal society.
17 1
It is difficult to reconcile this syllogistic reasoning with the economic
costs of taxation and government spending. Whether one believes that
government programs generally are worthwhile or wasteful, the argument
that they have little effect at all-even if only in the hedonic sense-seems
difficult to square with how individuals experience government programs
and with the amount of resources that the market spends in seeking to
shape them. This potential conclusion of the hedonic movement is yet
another argument for including multiple metrics to ensure a complete
account of a regulation's effects. While hedonics may have less relevance
or persuasiveness on matters of taxation or corporate impacts, they have
undeniable importance for matters affecting how individuals conduct their
affairs on a daily basis.
Accordingly, one can imagine how these regulations can become more
complete by the inclusion of additional tools. When evaluating regulations
like those of the EPA's that affect chronic conditions, regulators should
include happiness measures to account for those harms experienced over
time and without discrete costs. When regulations affect capabilities such
as HUD's, the government should be sure to include a discussion of the
capability loss, in addition to its traditional economic analysis. As the next
Section will discuss, the government should also include happiness
170 See Easterlin, supra note 106.
171 See Alesina et al., supra note 104.
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measures when evaluating a program that imposes varying time-sensitive
costs on differing classes of individuals.
C. DHS Aircraft and Vessels Pre-Departure Manifest Transmission
Regulation
In 2007, DHS sought to bolster its 2005 regulation, Electronic
Transmission of Passenger and Crew Manifests for Vessels and Aircraft,
which required that planes and ships transmit passenger manifests before
arriving in the United States, with additional requirements. 172 The 2007
DHS regulation, Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew
Member Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels, implements a
heightened statutory requirement that passenger manifests be
transmitted before the plane or vessel departs from its origin, rather than
solely in advance of its arrival.173 The final rule outlines three potential
conduits through which travel providers may transmit their manifests to
DHS: (1) through an interactive system that DHS established in the prior
regulation, which accepts one "batch" transmission of all passenger
information; (2) through DHS's interactive system that can accept
individual passenger information at the time of check-in; or (3) through a
non-interactive system with the added requirement that the data arrive at
least thirty minutes prior to the securing of cabin doors. 174
DHS estimates that the costs of this regulation stem primarily from
additional time costs imposed on passengers, airlines, and their
employees. 175 At a 7% discount rate, their assessment indicates that the
program will impose costs in the range of $612 million to $1.903 billion.
76
To arrive at these figures, DHS created two parallel cost models, which
accounted for the possibility of a low-cost outcome-in which all carriers
use the interactive system during passenger check-in-and a high-cost
outcome-in which all carriers submit data using their existing systems
and do so thirty minutes prior to departure. 177 After estimating the total
additional hours that the regulation would require in terms of traveler and
airline time, DHS employed existing Federal Aviation Administration
172 See 8 C.F.R. pts. 217, 231, 251 (2005); 19 C.F.R. pts. 4, 122, 178 (2007).
173 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006)).
174 See Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member Manifests for
Commercial Aircraft and Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320,48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007) (codified at 19 C.F.R.
pts. 4, 122 (2007)) [hereinafter DHS FR].
175 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REGULATORY ASSESSMENT: PASSENGER MANIFESTS FOR
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT ARRIVING IN AND DEPARTING FROM THE UNITED STATES 4 (2006) [hereinafter DHS
RIA].
176 Id. at 16.
177 Id. at 8-9, 12, 26.
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(FAA) assessments 178 to arrive at a cost of $28.60 for each additional hour
of traveler time imposed 179 and a cost of $18.29 for each additional hour of
airline employee work created. 180
DHS recognizes the difficulty of quantifying the benefits of a
regulation, the primary benefits of which are "to enhance security and
prevent dangerous individuals with nefarious intentions from successfully
carrying out attacks against the United States."' 8' Despite this challenge,
DHS presents monetized estimates of many of the costs avoided by the
rule: conducting interviews with identified individuals, deporting
individuals, delaying aircrafts, and rerouting aircrafts. 182 Each of these
benefits remains the same under DHS's low- or high-cost model and
results in quantified benefits with a present value of $103 million under a
7% discount rate.' 83 DHS asserts, however, that the bulk of the benefits
stems from avoided attacks and notes the difficulty in assessing (1) the
reduced probability of an attack; and (2) individuals' willingness-to pay for
that risk reduction.184 Because of this difficulty, DHS conducted a break-
even analysis, whereby the costs of the regulation become warranted for a
given percentage of risk reduction, under six possible scenarios. These
included three terrorist outcomes-(1) loss of life only; (2) loss of life and
aircraft; and (3) catastrophic loss of life and property-each modeled with
the value of a statistical life (VSL) set at $3 million and $6 million.
Necessary risk reduction for a break-even outcome ranged from 0.2% for
the catastrophic scenario with a VSL of $6 million to 44.2% for the loss of
life scenario with a VSL of $3 million.185
This regulation demonstrates how tremendously sensitive
government benefit-cost assessments can be to their assumptions. It may
be fair to suggest that the DHS regulations risk reduction falls between the
0.2% and 44.2% bounds that the analysis establishes, but what is the use
of such a large range? A 0.2% increase in safety appears marginal, whereas
asserting that the improvements of the 2007 rule over the 2005 rule
would have a 44.2% risk reduction does not appear credible. Accordingly,
if an OIRA desk officer felt that a 30% risk reduction would be reasonable
for the CEA, is it fair for the DHS analyst to respond that the OIRA official
should view the analysis under a $6 million VSL framework (with only a
178 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ECONOMIC VALUES FOR FAA INVESTMENT AND REGULATORY
DECISIONS: A GUIDE (2004), available at
http://www.faa.gov/regulations-policies/policy-guidance/benefit-cost/media/050404%2Critic
al%20Values%2ODec%203 1%2OReport%2007jan05.pdf.
179 See DHS RIA, supra note 175, at 9.
180 See id. at 10.
181 See id. at 17.
182 See id. at 19-22.
183 Id. at 22.
184 See DHS FR, supra note 174, at 48,339.
185 See id.
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22.1% risk reduction needed under scenario (1)) rather than the $3
million VSL estimate that produced a needed 44.2% risk reduction?
186
This difficulty exposes the challenge in having variable VSL levels
across different offices of the government. Building upon work begun by
Justice Stephen Breyer, Cass Sunstein has helpfully outlined the ranging
VSL levels employed by all government agencies, which range from $1.5
million for the Department of Transportation to $6.1 million for the
EPA. 187 Hedonic metrics do not solve this challenge-one might imagine
OIRA solving this problem by announcing a unified standard-though they
help to provide a more standardized tool for assessing how regulations
impact daily life. Hedonic data might be created to demonstrate how
consumers truly experience delayed wait times in airports or the feeling of
being more secure while traveling.
Despite the VSL concern, the $28.60 figure for the hourly cost of delay
may be this regulation's key flaw, in that it is a product of a 2003 FAA
analysis, which is no longer publicly available. Many government agencies
since 2003 have continued to employ this figure to account for costs of
delay,'8 8 though the original figure's origins remain unclear. This cost
likely stems from the average hourly wage of a typical international
traveler and thus falls squarely into Kahneman's critique of measures that
do not account for the duration or intensity of dissatisfaction. 189 According
to the DHS analysis, the first hour of delay imposes as much cost as the
seventh hour of delay. Kahneman's work suggests that the more one is
delayed, the more hedonic harm one experiences as a result during each
successive hour. 190
This hedonic reality would require a restructuring of the DHS
analysis. A more complete account would disaggregate the total hours
delayed into separate "hours-delayed" categories. The "first hour" would
have the highest quantity but impose the lowest cost. Each subsequent
hour would impose an increasing amount of harm but would comprise a
decreasing portion of the total hours delayed. To be precise, the DHS
analysis currently accounts for 1,420,448 hours of delay imposed in the
regulation's first year, but a more productive account would include how
many of those hours were an individual's "first hour" delayed and how
many represented subsequent hours. Analogizing from Kahneman's work,
those subsequent hours would likely impose greater hedonic costs along
186 See id.
187 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 78-79.
188 See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REGULATORY ASSESSMENT: THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TRAVEL INITIATIVE IMPLEMENTED IN THE AIR AND SEA ENVIRONMENTS 2-23 (2006); DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., REGULATORY EVALUATION: FINAL RULEMAKING 6 CFR PART 37 (2008).
189 See Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 112.
190 Under Kahneman's framework, one could envision the cumulative hedonic harm as
the integral of an increasing function.
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his "U-index" and could render the regulation increasingly costly. The
creation of the data to bring this new approach to life could involve a DRM-
like approach, through which individual travelers are asked to assess their
affect at differing times during a delayed trip. Aggregating that data and
applying it to the new composite of "hours-delayed" would render a more
complete picture of the regulation's effects on individuals.
Accounting more completely for those costs, however, does not
remedy the shortcomings of the benefit-side of this regulatory assessment.
Whenever an agency constructs its analysis in the form of a CEA or break-
even analysis, they effectively delegate authority to OIRA to make a quasi-
legal determination of whether their break-even level satisfies the
statutory requirements in a sufficiently efficient manner. John Graham, a
former OIRA Administrator, has defined this is as the BCA "soft test," in
which OIRA must assess whether a proposal's benefits "justify" its costs,
rather than determining that the benefits necessarily exceed the costs (the
"hard test"). 19 1 The key task then for regulators is to provide OIRA with as
representative a picture of the regulations' impacts as possible. Although it
is responsible to recognize that all benefits are not easily monetized,
agencies should strive to include a holistic account of how the regulation
benefits or imposes costs on society, rather than solely relying on
traditional neoclassical analysis which only captures easily monetized
effects along one dimension: dollars.
Specifically regarding the DHS regulation, the government might
consider tracking travelers' reported happiness in periods of varying
restrictions on travel. For an individual who travels frequently by air,
there may be significant changes in reported subjective well-being given
the awareness of varying levels of air security. Of course, this data would
have been most usefully collected before 9/11 and shortly after 9/11 for
useful baselines and then reassessed with each marginal regulation.
Without that historical data, the DHS might poll frequent international
travelers for their reported assessments of hedonic well-being when
traveling into and out of countries with more lax travel restrictions. If the
regulation were implemented in stages or through a trial program,
gathering data from those exercises could provide actionable data for
assessing the final rule nationwide.
Accordingly, providing such additional hedonic information would
equip OIRA with a more complete account of the DHS regulation's impacts
(positive and negative), which would be at least helpful for OIRA to make
the determination of whether the unquantified benefits warrant
regulation. In particular, for analyses involving break-even arguments, the
provision of a parallel set of materials that describes how the benefits
might affect individuals' happiness could also provide more useful indicia
191 Graham, supra note 45, at 431-34.
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of how people's affect might influence their travel propensities. This
analysis might reveal that individuals have a net positive hedonic
appreciation for their added safety, even when accounting for the negative
hedonic effects of added airport delays and potentially missed flights.
On this front, market data can reliably demonstrate some elements of
passenger behavior-whether more tickets were purchased after the
regulation when controlling for other variables and the productive value
lost from delays. As with other instances of evaluating market behavior,
however, this one-dimensional metric does not demonstrate intensity of
harm and fails to account for the increasing costs borne by those who
experience the harm over time. In addition, by being overly sensitive to
significant assumptions, the DHS account, like the EPA's mobile sources
regulatory assessment, provides little in the form of a bottom-line
assessment for OIRA to evaluate.
The composite of these three regulations demonstrates that the
current neoclassical approach to regulatory assessment not only fails to
provide the exhaustive account of a rule's impact but also evinces that the
hedonic approach may offer a parallel track for regulators to provide
compelling arguments for or against regulation. At present, agencies
operate under no requirement to engage in this form of analysis, and there
has yet to emerge a political call for such additional analysis. Moreover, as
this Note addresses in the next Part, courts have not imposed any
requirements relating to these metrics when assessing the thoroughness
of an agency's rulemaking procedures. Nevertheless, as these metrics
become increasingly common, their absence in a regulatory analysis may
render a regulation suspect to challenge on the basis of being arbitrary and
capricious, which is the focus of Part IV.
IV. The Agency Rulemaking Process and Judicial Review
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the procedures
through which agencies promulgate rules and through which courts may
review those decisions.192 Section IV.A discusses the existing conditions
under which agencies create rules. Section IV.B considers the standards
under which courts review challenges to agency rulemakings and
specifically examines the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard. Section
IV.C considers how the existence of new hedonic metrics may inform and
complicate review of agency rulemakings.
192 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2006).
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A. Contemporary Rulemaking Procedures
According to APA section 553, agencies must execute three steps
prior to issuing a new rule: (1) issuance of a notification of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM); (2) solicitation and consideration of public
comments; and (3) issuance of a final rule that addresses the public
comments and clarifies the rule's purpose.193 At the NPRM stage, agencies
publish in the Federal Register what they understand to be the problem
that they hope to address and, typically, a menu of potential policy options
(that is, potential rules) that would address the problem. The APA then
requires a waiting period, during which the public-most commonly, the
regulated industry and other interested parties-may submit public
comments to inform the agency decision making process. The agency must
then review the comments and demonstrate that it has considered the
public feedback before issuing a final rule. Agencies also publish their final
rules in the Federal Register in advance of codification in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
In addition to the procedural requirements of the APA, OMB also
requires that agencies participate in OIRA review before a proposed rule
becomes a final rule. 194 At that stage, the agency will have received all
public comments and ideally will have modified its rule to the extent that
the comments warrant change. Once the rule is in its near-final form, OMB
will review it and the agency's accompanying benefit-cost analysis to
ensure that not only has the agency responded adequately to the public
comments but also that the rule does not unnecessarily impose costs on
the public. 195 If OIRA certifies the rule, the agency may proceed to issue a
final rule.
Scholars have examined the rulemaking process at length-
particularly the degree to which public comments actually influence the
transformation from the NPRM stage to the final rule. 196 Although that
debate is beyond the scope of this Note, it is needless to say there remains
an open question as to whether varying levels of public participation result
in rules that improve social welfare or result in rules that are increasingly
a product of agency capture. Regardless of the merits of the existing
process, courts-when a rule is challenged-become interested in two
critical components of the rulemaking history: (1) that the agency followed
the process outlined by the APA; and (2) that the final rule falls within the
permissible realm of intended regulatory effect that Congress envisioned
when passing the authorizing statute. Although both these topics are
193 Id. § 553.
194 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 644 (1993).
195 See supra Part i.
196 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 45, at 510.
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considered at greater length in the next Section, so long as some statutory
provision can be interpreted to grant rulemaking power and there is no
compelling evidence to the contrary, courts are likely to recognize agency
power to make policy through binding rules. 197
B. Review ofAgency Rulemaking
Interested parties may "petition [an agency] for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of [any] rule."'198 Any petition denied by an agency
must be accompanied by "a brief statement of the grounds for denial."1 99
Rather than contacting agencies for an explanation, parties may also
challenge agency actions directly in court, as the APA provides a cause of
action for individuals challenging a federal agency action. 20 0 The APA
compels courts sitting in review of the challenged action to "hold unlawful
and set aside" actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion."201 In cases of challenged agency action, despite the deferential
treatment that courts give administrative bodies when adjudicating claims,
there exists a strong presumption of judicial review of any agency action at
the outset.202
Since the enactment of the APA, the Supreme Court has held that
review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is "deferential." 20 3 In
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, the Court refused to
invalidate an agency action unless the record demonstrates that the
agency "has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency," or is so unreasonable that the outcome could not be a
result of the agency's comparative expertise. 204 Courts will even leave
agency action intact if it is "of less than ideal clarity [so long as] the
agency's path may reasonably be discerned."
20 s
The above standards apply to informal or "notice-and-comment"
rulemaking-the overwhelmingly predominant form of rulemaking-but
the standards differ slightly if the agency has engaged in formal
rulemaking under APA sections 556 and 557. If the agency rule results
from formal rulemaking or an agency hearing process, it must not only
197 See Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
198 S U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006).
199 Id. § 555(e).
200 Id. § 706.
201 Id. § 706(2).
202 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
203 Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007).
204 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
205 Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974).
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satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard but also be supported by
"substantial evidence." 206 Additionally, many organic statutes contain
provisions asserting that agency findings of fact shall be "conclusive" only
if they are "supported by substantial evidence."20 7 Courts, therefore, have
developed a body of law governing the review of agency determinations of
fact under the substantial evidence standard.
Since passage of the APA, courts have required that substantial
evidence be "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." 20 8 In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, for instance, the Court
described "substantial evidence" as being similar to the review that
appellate courts afford jury determinations of fact.20 9 Additionally, courts
will only reverse the agency action "when the record is so compelling that
no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find to the contrary."210 To say the
least, this review is not a "rubber-stamp[}," as Justice Breyer, writing for
the Court in Dickinson v. Zurko, noted. 21 ' Though the APA does not require
the same trial-like record creation for informal rulemaking as for formal
rulemaking,21 2 agencies still must produce evidence such that courts can
evaluate the adequacy of their decisionmaking procedures. Martin Shapiro,
for instance, has characterized these requirements of the APA as a "giving
reasons" requirement, insofar as the agency must give reasons for its
action to facilitate the APA's judicial review process. 21 3 Despite no explicit
statutory requirement of "reason-giving," the agencies still must furnish
evidence to avoid having their determinations overruled as arbitrary and
capricious. 21 4 As decisions relating to benefit-cost assessments would be
considered determinations of fact, courts could review many of this Note's
relevant claims under their substantial evidence standard.
Although a litigant may challenge almost any agency action in court,
the scope of review under the APA is "narrow,"215 which permits agencies
"wide latitude" in electing their course of action. 216 A court is to take the
record as presented and is not "to substitute its own judgment for that of
206 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
207 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (2006) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 49
U.S.C. § 46,110(c) (2006) (FAA).
208 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
209 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
210 Highlands Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Palace
Sports & Entm't, Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F.3d 212, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
211 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
213 See Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 184-
85.
214 See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.]. 952,
972-73 (2007).
215 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
216 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001).
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the [agency]." 217 To that end, courts generally uphold agency actions if the
agency "engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, and the decision is
adequately explained and supported by the record."218 Evaluations of a
rule's costs and benefits comprise an essential component of the record
that courts review when assessing a rule's validity and thus are central to
both the arbitrary and capricious analysis and the "substantial evidence"
inquiry.
Courts therefore review two aspects of rulemakings: (1) the
procedures through which the agency created the rule; and (2) the
substance of the rule promulgated. First, when reviewing the procedures
that undergird the development of a rule, litigants may raise challenges
under the protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme
Court, however, famously held in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board
of Equalization that few procedural protections were required for
rulemakings because the political process should safeguard the public
from abuse. 219 Courts have, accordingly, consistently afforded minimal due
process protections to parties affected by rulemakings, 220 and courts have
consistently refused to require any additional procedural requirements
than those mandated by the APA.
221
Second, after a determination that a rule is not arbitrary and
capricious, courts review whether the rule is substantively consistent with
the authorizing statute. With an organic statute that provides broad
latitude for agency rulemaking discretion, the review of the substance of
final agency rulemakings under the arbitrary and capricious standard
"overlaps analytically" 222 with the review that accompanies analysis under
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.223 Though this Note will
focus primarily on arbitrary and capricious analysis, it is worth noting that
there are conceivable scenarios in which an agency action might be judged
as surpassing the bar set by arbitrary and capricious analysis yet fail upon
substantive review under Chevron's reasonableness test.
C. Hedonic Metrics in Arbitrary and Capricious Analysis
Because the consideration of hedonic metrics is currently absent in
most regulatory analysis, this Note focuses on the second prong of the
217 Id.
218 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 29 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
219 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
220 See, e.g., Curlott v. Campbell, 598 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1979).
221 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
222 S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist v. EPA, 554 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also
Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 414 F.3d 76, 96-97 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (collecting cases for this
proposition).
223 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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State Farm arbitrary and capricious test in depth: whether an agency has
properly considered an essential element or consequence of its action. As
the D.C. Circuit has often noted in expounding upon this State Farm
standard, if an agency does not sufficiently consider a "relevant and
significant aspect" of a problem during the rulemaking process, that
absence may render its decision arbitrary and capricious. 22 4 A central
inquiry of this Note is whether hedonic impacts of federal regulations are
"relevant and significant" aspects of a proposed regulation. If that proves
true, courts could determine that by not evaluating hedonic effects, the
agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem."
225
Courts have been willing to hold agency action arbitrary and
capricious due to flaws in benefit-cost analyses. In 2008, for example, the
Ninth Circuit held that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's failure to monetize benefits rendered its regulation
arbitrary and capricious. 226 The agency could not, according to the court,
"put a thumb on the scale" by manipulating the manner in which it
presented the rule's benefits and costs. 227 The Court of Federal Claims
similarly found a benefit-cost analysis relating to a bid protest to be
"flawed" because it did not consider secondary costs to the agency's
procurement system.228 Courts could, therefore, construe the inclusion of
only traditional neoclassical data in contemporary benefit-cost analyses as
a "thumb on the scale" in favor of their desired outcomes if a litigant
argues compellingly that the presentation of hedonic data might tilt the
scales in the opposite direction. Courts do not appreciate data
manipulation toward the agency's desired outcome, and arbitrary and
capricious challenges may be viable if hedonic metrics would result in an
outcome opposed to the agency's desired rule.
Courts will additionally fault agencies for not including explanations
for important steps of their regulatory analyses. After reviewing an
agency's regulatory impact analysis, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
"complete lack of explanation for an important step in the agency's
224 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place
for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.j. 2, 7 (2009) (describing the D.C.
Circuit's review as ensuring that the decisionmaking is "technocratic" and "expert-driven").
225 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
226 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1198-1203 (9th Cir. 2008).
227 Id. at 1198.
228 E-Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 1 (Fed. Cl. 2008); see
also Serco Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 463, 496 (Fed. Cl. 2008) ("[A] court must accord
considerable deference to an agency's best-value decision in trading off price with other factors.");
Superior Helicopter LLC v. United States, 78 Fed. CI. 181, 193 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (holding that because
a "decision did not rely on the quantitative costs... the fact that the [agency's] findings lacked
quantitative calculations of costs is not itself problematic").
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analysis was arbitrary and capricious." 229 Moreover, a separate D.C. Circuit
case found that though an agency asserting its rule would reduce a kind of
risk, "the [agency] cite[d] no evidence that the final rule would achieve that
goal."230 Consequently, the rule was held arbitrary and capricious. 231 If
courts review agency RIAs for explanations of their benefit-cost calculus
and the evidence relied upon, agencies may become similarly vulnerable
for leaving unaccounted an entire class of impacts and potentially available
evidence. Although an agency may be able to dispense with this
requirement with a cogent explanation of why it did not include hedonic
costs and benefits, that determination will be similarly reviewable, and
litigants will have an opportunity to argue that evidence of hedonic
impacts was available.
Importantly, courts have also been willing to find rules arbitrary and
capricious, even if the agency asserts that data that would be necessary to
conduct a more thorough benefit-cost analysis is unavailable or
unobtainable. In Public Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, the D.C. Circuit held a Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration rule to be arbitrary and capricious because it did not
adequately consider the costs of the regulation on a subset of drivers, even
though the agency asserted that it "did not have sufficient data on the
magnitude of such effects." 2 32 This holding suggests that courts may be
willing to force agencies to find new data that the courts find compelling.
In other words, if courts begin to require hedonic data, agencies may be
precluded from claiming that they do not have the capability to obtain that
information or that reliable benchmarks are unavailable. Although
beginning the process of collecting and evaluating this data may be costly,
a strong signal from the courts would likely compel agencies to ensure that
their subsequent RIAs contain this kind of analysis.
Courts, however, remain deferential to agencies, particularly when
evaluating their benefit-cost assessments. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has
noted repeatedly that "cost-benefit analyses epitomize the types of
decisions that are most appropriately entrusted to the expertise of an
agency." 233 For instance, after considering the components of an FAA
229 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 494 F.3d
188, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("When an agency uses a computer model, it must 'explain the assumptions and methodology
used in preparing the model."' (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705
F.2d 506, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
230 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 429
F.3d 1136, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
231 Id.
232 374 F.3d 1209, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
233 Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Idaho Rivers United v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 189 Fed. App'x
629,637 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, when a dispute implicates
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benefit-cost assessment, which found a benefit-to-cost ratio of 6.2:1, the
D.C. Circuit in 2008 held that an FAA plan to permit cities to impose
"Passenger Facility Charges" on travelers was not arbitrary and
capricious. 234 The Eleventh Circuit has also refused to hear claims relating
to flawed benefit-cost analyses if the parties did not file public comments
relating to the proposed analysis during the open comment period. 235 In
instances in which a statute mandates an outcome that does not result in
the highest net social benefit, the D.C. Circuit has found omissions in
benefit-cost methodology to be harmless error.
2 36
These cases show that, despite instances in which courts have been
willing to delve into agency RIAs, the overall evaluative heuristic remains
highly deferential, particularly given the fact-bound circumstances that
drive benefit-cost assessments. Unsurprisingly, no recorded cases could be
found in which litigants challenged agency action under the arbitrary and
capricious standard for the agency's failure to account for hedonic costs,
and there appear to be no indications from the judiciary that such
challenges would be well-received. Regardless, three conclusions may still
follow: (1) agencies can only improve their chances of not being reversed
by including considerations of the hedonic impacts of their regulations;
(2) it is conceivable that with hedonic metrics gaining increased salience in
the legal community, a judge could consider hedonic harms "an important
aspect of the problem" under State Farm;2 3 7 and (3) courts should include
improving happiness as an important regulatory goal that agencies should
consider when conducting regulatory analysis.
On the first point, if agencies are regulating to advance social welfare,
they only stand to gain by including a more complete account of their
proposed regulation's effects in their RIAs. Although the possibility exists
that the consideration of hedonic metrics could run contrary to regulatory
objectives, the inclusion of that information might lead the agency to alter
their final regulation, which could result in a more socially beneficial
outcome. Additionally, if an agency's objective is to avoid judicial reversal,
the agency may prefer to regulate with a smaller scope-that can
demonstrate positive or less negative hedonic effects than their ideal
regulation-but with a higher certainty of regulatory finality. Thus, the
desire to avoid the cost of undertaking the rulemaking process a second
time may compel agencies to include these metrics.
substantial agency expertise and involves primary issues of fact, courts must defer to the informed
discretion of the responsible federal agencies.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
234 St. John's United Church of Christ v. FAA, 550 F.3d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
235 Miami-Dade County v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1058 n.8 (11th Cir. 2008).
236 City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit held
similarly in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA that benefit-cost considerations do not trump congressional
mandates. 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007).
237 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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The second conclusion involves the inherently subjective judicial
determination of what is an "important" element of the regulated harm. At
present, no evidence exists to suggest that courts are inclined to include
improvement of happiness as an important regulatory goal, but the
growing tide of happiness scholarship may indicate an increased
awareness that individuals experience the effects of regulation and social
harms in ways that traditional neoclassical analysis cannot capture. As this
evidence becomes increasingly developed, courts may become more aware
of these tools and more likely to credit litigants' claims that agencies acted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner by not assessing them. Only the
passage of time, increased scholarship on this subject, and heightened
prominence in the legal community, however, will persuade courts to
consider social happiness as a "relevant and significant aspect" of a
regulated problem.
238
Finally, even though courts may not be considering these metrics
currently as a descriptive matter, from a normative perspective, courts
should hold agencies accountable for considering these measures in their
analyses. The behavioral research indicates unambiguously that the
assumptions that undergird neoclassical economics are at least incomplete
and potentially highly flawed. That federal agencies rely exclusively on
those assumptions in quantifying how their proposed regulations will
impact society renders their analysis incomplete. Although arbitrary and
capricious is a standard designed to facilitate agency discretion, agencies
still have the responsibility to justify the costs their actions may impose.
Because courts have been willing to reverse agency action when they have
not fully justified all costs, they should similarly consider reversing agency
action that imposes hedonic costs that the agency does not assess.
Critics of this proposal should raise institutional competency
concerns, specifically noting that agencies are better suited than judges to
determine the manner in which they should structure their regulatory
assessments. 239 Although agencies undeniably have greater expertise in
constructing BCAs, they similarly have greater skills in crafting analyses
that may avoid accounting for critical regulatory costs. Litigants, therefore,
bear the initial burden of challenging these analyses and making the
compelling case to courts that existing standards of administrative law can
facilitate the reversal of incomplete analyses. Judges do not exceed their
institutional competence when applying established legal principles to
evaluating whether agencies have acted in a manner consistent with their
statutory obligations. Under the APA, judges routinely assess whether
agencies have manipulated computer models or statistical analyses that
may have been initially thought to be beyond judges' institutional
238 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
239 See Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31,44 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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competence. 240 Diligent litigants raised these claims in a manner that
compelled judges to realize that the agency action, in light of their flawed
models, was arbitrary and capricious. This too can be the case with
hedonic metrics.
The economics scholarship has reached near consensus on the point
that the neoclassical account of pure rationality and self-interest does not
perfectly represent actual human behavior. If the government wishes to
regulate to improve human welfare, its regulatory assessments should be
informed by the behavioral scholarship that observes and draws
conclusions from actual human behavior. Judges thus should not hesitate
to require agencies to provide analyses that measure elements of human
happiness. Only by providing hedonic metrics in combination with existing
regulatory tools can regulators account for the entirety of a rule's impacts
and thus not act in a manner contrary to the APA's arbitrary and
capricious requirement. Although there does not appear to be any judicial
movement on this front at present, change may come in proportion to the
speed with which this scholarship becomes more mainstream. 241 As
litigants become increasingly aware of the multifarious hedonic impacts of
regulation, judges should become increasingly willing to credit their claims
that an agency acted arbitrarily in not considering happiness as "an
important aspect of the problem." 242
Conclusion
This Note has intended to demonstrate a series of five tiered claims.
First, and most basically, the existing BCA regime, which is guided by
OIRA's reliance on neoclassical economics, insufficiently captures the
effects of regulation. Volumes of research by behavioral economists have
demonstrated that neoclassical assumptions result in inaccurate
conclusions, and those conclusions should not guide federal regulatory
policy. Second, additional metrics exist-measures of subjective well-
being and moment-to-moment affect-that have the potential, in
conjunction with existing tools, to provide a more complete assessment of
how regulations affect individuals.
Third, irrespective of how courts may perceive their actions,
regulators should begin to incorporate these new tools in their
forthcoming regulatory assessments because it will result in better public
240 See U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
241 For the most recent "mainstream" effort on this front, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
242 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
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policy. Considering a more holistic account of outcomes will result in
superior regulations, despite the possibility that their inclusion will result
in analyses with conclusions different from regulator objectives. Fourth,
though courts currently have shown no indication that they would be
willing to find a regulation to be arbitrary and capricious for the agency's
failure to include hedonic metrics, they may do so in the future. The
determination of what is an "important aspect" of the regulated problem is
an inherently subjective evaluation, which should evolve with the
increased salience of this field. As litigants become more capable with
these arguments, courts may become increasingly likely to credit those
arguments. This descriptive account of how courts may evolve alters the
incentives for agencies. If an agency wants to avoid reversal for arbitrary
and capricious action, they should include these metrics as, at the very
least, a precautionary measure.
Finally, this Note has argued that courts need not wait for a more
complete consensus on the value of hedonic metrics in BCA to begin
holding agencies responsible for their use. Under prevailing
jurisprudential standards, courts can find that failure to employ hedonic
metrics renders a regulation arbitrary and capricious. Courts have been
willing to delve into agencies' BCA methodologies and to require them to
obtain data previously considered unavailable. These standards
analogously suggest that the existing administrative law framework
permits judges to find agency rulemakings invalid under the APA for not
assessing hedonic costs and benefits. This step will provide the optimal
incentive for agencies to craft the best policies and render courts'
approaches to these cases consonant with their treatment of other BCA-
related claims.
Vol. 27:1, 2010
